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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VERDON C. BRINKERHOFF, 
Petitioner/Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890499-CA 
Category 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is the State's appeal from the final judgment of 
the Third Judicial District Court which, after review de novo, 
reversed the decision of the Division of Driver License Services 
(DLS) to suspend for ninety days the driving privilege of 
Appellant VerDon C. Brmkerhoff (Driver) . It is not disputed 
that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent contends that the following issues are 
presented to this Court for review: 
1. What are the formal requirements under UAPA for the 
initiation of and decision rendered in these proceedings. 
2. Whether DLS complied with these requirements in the 
r-*c!+-ar»+- r«^c;fa. 
3. Whether the findings entered by the trial court are 
clearly erroneous. 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
setting aside the agency action. 
5. Whether any of the issues presented herein are 
moot. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Constitution of the United States, Amend. 14 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-l, et seq. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-2-128 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
R. Utah Ct. App. 37(a) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a review of the final judgment of the 
District Court sitting without a jury in a de novo review of DLS' 
order suspending Respondent's driving privileges. The trial 
court reversed and set aside the agency decision, holding that 
the agency had failed to comply with the UAPA in initiating the 
action and in rendering its decision. 
Respondent generally concurs with the statement of the 
facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, although not all facts 
recited therein are necessary for disposition of this appeal. 
While the Driver's testimony in the trial court is of collateral 
use in the disposition hereof, primary reliance is upon the 
documents generated by DLS, which are reproduced in the Addendum 
hereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Driver contends that DLS failed to comply with the 
requirements of UAPA in the two regards stated above. After 
evidentiary hearing and review, the trial court agreed, and the 
brief of DLS does not cite any evidence to the contrary. As a 
result of this non-compliance with UAPA, the agency decision must 
be set aside for its failure to afford the Driver due process of 
law in the determination of his driving privilege. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1_ 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
REQUIRES DLS TO SERVE A WRITTEN NOTICE 
WHICH CONTAINS A STATEMENT AS TO WHETHER 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS WILL BE CONDUCTED 
FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY 
The enactment of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) in 1987 provided state agencies and the public with a 
comprehensive framework for initiating, conducting, and appealing 
from adjudicative administrative proceedings that determine a 
person's legal rights, duties, privileges, and licenses. See 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(1), et seq. Section §63-46b-4(1) allows 
State agencies to designate either formal or informal proceedings 
for the various actions these agencies undertake. 
The administrative action in this case is a 90-day "per 
se" driving suspension provided by Utah Code Ann, §41-2-128. DLS 
has asserted, for the first time at the administrative hearing, 
and again at trial d£ novo, that such action is an informal 
proceeding, as so designated in the rules of that agency. 
Under UAPA, an administrative action such as the 
instant one may be commenced by the filing and service of a 
written notice of agency action which "shall include" basic 
information about the proceeding. In addition to the name and 
address of persons receiving notice, the file number, the name of 
the action, and the date mailed, the notice must also include a 
statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted formally or informally. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-3, 
reproduced in part in Addendum A. 
The wisdom of the provisions of UAPA which require the 
agency to state whether proceedings are informal or informal is 
apparent from a review of the Act's bifurcated treatment of these 
two types of administrative actions. The applicability of 
responsive pleadings, discovery, subpoenas, admissibility of 
evidence, hearing procedure, intervention, and the form of 
judicial review are all factors wholly dependent upon whether a 
proceeding is formal or informal. In order to prepare one's 
position in advance of the hearing, it is elemental that a party 
to an adjudicative administrative proceeding know what rules are 
at play, what the scope and function of the hearing are, and what 
level of judicial review is available. Only then can a party be 
said to have been afforded the procedural integrity and due 
process of law that UAPA obviously intended to insure. 
The sound and clear language of UAPA requires that the 
notice of agency action contain a statement as to whether the 
proceedings are to be conducted formally or informally. Absent 
such language, further proceedings would not only run afoul of 
the provisions of UAPA, but would deny parties to administrative 
proceedings fundamental notice as to the nature of those 
proceedings, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and Constitution of Utah, 
Article I, Section 7. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
REQUIRES DLS TO ISSUE AND MAIL TO EACH 
PARTY A WRITTEN ORDER CONTAINING 
THE DECISION, REASONS THEREFOR, AND 
THE RIGHT TO AND TIME FOR APPEAL 
The UAPA requires the officer presiding over informal 
adjudicative proceedings to issue a signed written order within a 
reasonable time. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-5(1)(i), reproduced in 
Addendum B. Such an order is to be based upon the evidence 
introduced in the action, and must be promptly mailed to all 
parties. The language of the Act requires that the order state: 
a) the decision; b) the reasons for the decision; c) a notice 
of any right of review; and d) the time limits for filing an 
appeal or requesting a review. 
The policy considerations behind this requirement again 
appear to be of a fundamental nature. Not only should a party 
whose rights or privileges are adjudicated know what the agency's 
final determination is, but the reasons that the agency made such 
a decision. Only by knowing the basis or bases of the decision 
can the party decide what issues are in dispute, whether there 
are singular or multiple grounds of purported justification for 
the decision, whether review is appropriate, and, if so, whether 
review should be requested administratively or judicially. 
The requirement of the UAPA that the reasons for the 
decision be stated in the order facilitates a meaningful 
understanding of the decision and the options available after the 
decision has been rendered at that level. Such an understanding 
is crucial to a party's evaluation as to how to proceed and upon 
what basis. This requirement further serves to focus the review 
tribunal's attention on those issues truly in contention, and 
provides the context for meaningful review of the proceedings 
below. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT DLS 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT, BOTH IN 
INITIATING PROCEEDINGS AND RENDERING 
A DECISION, ENJOYS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT 
IN THE RECORD BELOW 
At the outset, it should be noted that UAPA provides 
for de novo District Court review of decisions rendered in 
informal adjudicative administrative proceedings. The District 
Court, without a jury, determines all questions of fact and law 
as well as any constitutional issues presented. At this level, 
the pleadings and proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-15, reproduced in Addendum C. 
The District Court's role in a d£ novo review is 
analogous to that in the bench trial of a civil matter (the 
pleadings are, in fact, captioned as in a civil matter, and the 
"trial" is conducted in that fashion). As such, the standard of 
review adopted by this Court on appeal from the District Court's 
decision should be that normally applied in reviewing civil bench 
trials. 
On appeal of a judgment from the bench after trial, 
appellate courts defer to the trial court's factual assessments 
unless there is clear error. Copper State Leasing vs. Blacker 
Appliance & Furniture, 90 U.A.R. 23 at 26 (Utah, 1988), 
U.R.Civ.P. 52(a). To be clearly erroneous, a finding must be 
shown by the appellant to be against the clear weight of evidence 
or that it induces a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made. Maughan vs. Maughan, 102 U.A.R. 44 (Utah Ct. 
App., 1989). If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence, the 
trial court's findings will be affirmed on appeal. Gillmor vs. 
Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App., 1987). 
Appellant apparently contests the trial court's finding 
that DLS failed to comply with the plain requirements of the UAPA 
in two separate and distinct respects: sufficiency of the notice 
of action and sufficiency of the order of decision. It is the 
appellant's burden to cite the appellate court to all the 
evidence in the record that would demonstrate why, even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the court below, it is 
insufficient to support the finding under attack. Harker vs. 
Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. App., 
1987). In its brief, appellant has failed to marshal any 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
As to the issue of sufficiency of the notice of action, 
neither the DUI Summons and Citation/Notice of Intent to Suspend 
or Revoke served on the Driver (Addendum D) nor the notice of 
hearing mailed to him (Addendum E) contain any language 
designating the proceedings as formal or informal. Nowhere in 
Appellant's brief is this assertion controverted. The record 
below shows not only substantial support of the trial court's 
finding of non-compliance by DLS, but rather compels such a 
finding given the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 
Given the failure of DLS to comply with the notice 
provisions of the UAPA, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in setting aside the Order of Suspension issued by 
that agency, a remedy which the Act expressly authorizes. See 
Utah Code Ann. §6 3-4 6b-17(1)(b)(lii). 
Likewise, the trial court was compelled to find 
non-compliance by DLS in regard to stating reasons for its 
decision in the order mailed to the Driver. While DLS argues 
here, as below, that reasons for the decision are stated on the 
Order of Suspension (Addendum F), inspection of that document 
negates such an assertion. DLS cites only the conclusional third 
paragraph in support of its position, which in essence restates 
the very statute to which it alludes. Given the two different 
typestyles on the document, it is apparent that the order is a 
form letter used in this kind of proceeding. Nowhere is the 
Driver apprised of the factual findings or bases for the 
decision, which arguments were considered, accepted, rejected, or 
determinative, what blood alcohol level was found to be present, 
or any other relevant factor. In short, the order provides the 
Driver with no further information about how the decision was 
reached, other than that his license has been suspended as a 
result of his arrest for DUI. This general and conclusional 
proposition is one of which the Driver is already well aware. 
Given the additional failure of DLS to comply with the 
decisional requirements of the UAPA, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in setting aside the Order of Suspension 
issued by that agency, on this independent basis as well. 
Point II of DLS1 brief asserts that the Driver's 
alleged failure "to timely object to the informal nature of the 
administrative proceedings11 invokes some form of estoppel, and 
should now preclude consideration of issues raised, reached, and 
decided by the trial court. This analysis is flawed in the 
following three regards. 
First, the Driver has never objected to the proceedings 
being informal, but rather has asserted that he was entitled to 
written notice as to whether the proceedings would be formal or 
informal. 
Second, the transcript of the administrative hearing 
(reproduced at Appellant's Brief, Addendum C), at page 24 and 25, 
reveals that the Driver's counsel specifically moved the hearing 
officer for a dismissal of the administrative action due to DLS' 
failure to designate either formal or informal proceedings. This 
assertion, together with separate ground of non-compliance with 
UAPA in respect to the content of the order rendered, were fully 
raised and argued before the District Court, as is apparent from 
the Petition for Review, the evidence introduced, closing 
argument, and the findings of fact made by the trial court. 
Failure to timely object was not raised in the District Court by 
DLS. 
Third, in the District Court, and again on appeal in 
Point III of its brief, DLS argued that since review by that 
Court was de novo, defects in the proceedings below can be cured 
at the District Court level. Assuming arguendo that the Driver 
failed to raise the issue to the hearing officer, this assertion 
is flawed and results in disparate treatment. With this 
statement, DLS assumes the untenable and blatantly unfair 
position that the agency can take two bites at the apple to 
remedy an omission, while the driver is stuck with whatever 
omissions occur at the agency level. Such a proposition makes a 
mockery of notions of fundamental fairness between parties to an 
administrative proceeding. 
POINT IV 
DLS IMPROPERLY URGES CONSIDERATION OF 
MATTERS NOT INTRODUCED OR RAISED BELOW 
Appellant's Brief references various materials that are 
not part of the record on appeal. Such matters may not 
ordinarily be considered for the first time in the appellate 
court. Mel Trimble Real Estate vs. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 
P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah Ct. App., 1988). This is true even if the 
matters brought forth are of a nature that can be taken by 
judicial notice. 
Several items appended to Appellant's Brief were not 
presented below, though most are of questionable value in the 
resolution of this appeal. These include the Driver's request 
for hearing (Appellant's Addendum B) , the agency's Findings of 
Proceedings (Appellant's Addendum D), the reinstatement of the 
Driver's privileges, found in Appellant's Addendum F, DLS Rules 
and Regulations (Appellant's Addendum G), and the Comments of the 
Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee found in Appellant's 
Addendum H. 
DLS now claims that these materials, which were not 
before the trial court, lend credence to its position. While it 
is unclear how any of these materials vitiate the express 
requirements of the UAPA, it is simply too late in the day to 
present them for consideration for the first time. DLS had its 
opportunity to present them to the trial court, but failed to do 
so. Matters not presented for consideration of the trial court 
should be deemed waived for purposes of this appeal. 
POINT V 
A SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS AS TO POINT I, 
SUPRA, ARISES DUE TO DLS' RECENT 
INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE IN NOTICES 
INITIATING THIS TYPE OF PROCEEDING 
After the de novo review of this matter, DLS began 
using a different form for the notices of hearing in actions such 
as this. Counsel for the Driver, in an unrelated case, received 
such a form and has submitted the same for this Court's 
consideration as to potential mootness of Point I, supra. The 
new form, with case-specific data omitted, is reproduced in 
Addendum G. 
With the inclusion of the language that an "informal 
hearing" (underlining original) will be held in the action, the 
instant concern of the Driver about sufficiency of the notice 
appears to have application only to this case and others appealed 
before the change was made, if any. Little or no prospective 
relief from this deficiency will be required as a result. As a 
practical matter, DLS has remedied one of the two points of 
non-compliance which were the bases of the District Court's 
ruling. 
While the Driver does not necessarily contend that this 
factor is dispositive of the appeal, and therefore does not move 
for a dismissal for mootness, counsel is aware if his duty under 
R. Utah Ct. App» 37(a), and merely seeks to advise the Court as 
to factors it may deem relevant to possible issues of mootness. 
These circumstances also bear on the issue of whether the conduct 
of DLS after the de novo trial constitutes an implied confession 
of manifest error at the agency level. 
CONCLUSION 
The UAPA sets forth specific requirements for 
initiating and rendering decisions in informal adjudicative 
proceedings. In this instant case, the evidence before the trial 
court was undisputed that DLS did not in fact comply. Since the 
Driver was not afforded the due process envisioned in the UAPA, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the 
agency's order, and accordingly the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
January, 1990. 
/stk 
to the Court this /h day of 
WILLIAM R. RUSSELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE 
// T^ 
I hereby certify that on this /& day of January, 
1990, I filed seven copies of Respondent's Brief by mailing the 
same by First Class Mail to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
and that I mailed four copies thereof on such date to: 
Richard D. Wyss 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative 
proceedings shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the 
agency; or 
fb) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by per-
sons other than the agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the 
following requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presid-
ing officer, and shall include: 
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice 
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mail-
ing address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to 
appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted 
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the 
provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that 
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the 
mailing date of the notice of agency action; 
(viij if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is 
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any 
724 
ADDENDUM B 
63-46b-5 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights 
of any party. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-4, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, § 260. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudica-
tive proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by 
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include 
the following: 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and requires a response, no 
answer or other pleading responsive to the allegations contained in the 
notice of agency action or the request for agency action need be filed. 
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and is requested by a party 
within the time prescribed by rule. 
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of agency action or 
in the request for agency action shall be permitted to testify, present 
evidence, and comment on the issues. 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties. 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency may issue subpoenas or 
other orders to compel production of necessary evidence. 
(f) All parties shall have access to information contained in the 
agency's files and to all materials and information gathered in any inves-
tigation, to the extent permitted by law. 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules 
permitting intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a 
state permit intervention. 
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing that 
states the following: 
(i) the decision: 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative or judicial review avail-
able to the parties; and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review. 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the facts appearing in 
the agency's files and on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings. 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly mailed to 
each of the parties. 
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing. 
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or 
power given to an agency by another statute. 
History: 
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ADDENDUM C 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial re-
view; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the 
agency action: 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v.) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed-
ing; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) t'a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
ADDENDUM D 
' i . DUI 
SUMMONS AND CITATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNTY OF O M T vni / r 
ISSUING 
ENFORCEMENT . 
[AGENCY r^_n ?| r ^ ^ T ^ / / r ( l ^ ^ 
NAME-
r Y OF • . g n i o n I N « ( 
HE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
VEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN 
PAT ~ 7(YJ ( i r -_.^t^7 £ 
_ _ ^ / w / / 5 
; CASE | CITATION NO 
vTr- jnD 20591 
 (Last) (urst) >* (Mio (Middle* DOB 
"ADORE (State J ,Z.p 
Driver License No , Licenjip ua 
nrtr.7? 77>f Heigrr Wetgnt 
Licenjip Class 
m 
E*p"es j Slate I Restriction Code 
/o ur ' r/ 
Mouatf ycie 
^ e s " No 
Vehicle Ma*e Vehicle Type Vehicle *ea 
Ev#% , Sex i Vehitie License No | State Expires 
iCoip- yammer: Direct. 
/^JT^V**) No .)J1 
- ^ 
on rr Trawe 
iCtS E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING 
.". UTAH CODE COUNTY CODE i CITY CODE NO.. 
ON THE <- f> DAv CP CC LL£L£— 19 i L l i MILITARY TIME \*~f ]> S^ 
LOCATION ^ . / ^ ' c ^CClLJ- MILE POST NO 
VIOLATIONS. tfH/tf^J , unxiz/j'- r/^ AAJS.-'J.' (S\ ' ' 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE X A - . I ''— 
. / 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DEFENDANT 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW I FURTHER CER-
TIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER 
COURT PURSUANT TQ^ECTION 77-7-19 U C.A 
L OFFICER 
O I 
BAOGE NO V'J 
COMPLAINANT 
— " w - - f 4 z - / ? 2 y 
DATE OF CITATION 
DATE SENT TO OLD DOCKET NO 
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION 
VALID 
READ CAREFULLY S U R R . L I C 
i citation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent. If an information is 
I you will be provided a copy by the court You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in this citation 
OU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR 
JR ARREST. 
HOE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE You are hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from the date of 
notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah will be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-19.6 
\ for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second 
subsequent occurrence of this offense OR if a peace officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a 
mical test to determine the alcohol o? drug content of your breath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified 
thirty-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of 
h will be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44.10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RE-
EST A HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION The hearing is not for purposes of granting you 
ttited license but only to determine whether or not your license should be suspended or revoked. 
he department will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing Your WRIT-
J REQUEST must be sent WITHIN TFN fim DAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION at 
1 South 2700 West. P.O. Box~30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon ycur timely written request for a 
ring you will be notified of a time and place to appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license 
pension or revocation will become effective as indicated above. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and 
s not satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court. 
HORARY DRIVER LICENSE: This entire information X is VALID as a temporary driver license for a period of 
V (30) days from the date of this notice H is NOT VALID as a temporary driver license. 
ADDENDUM E 
DOB: 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
DA: 1 U - Z O - 0 0 
NORMAN H BANCERTFR. UOVhRNOR 
November 4, 1988 
JOHN 1 NIELSKN COMMISSIONER 
D DOUGLAS BODRKRO DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
Verdon C. Brinkerhoff 
917 Park Row 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84105 
1434579 
FILE NO.: 
D.O.B.: 8~5-38 
Under Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, a hearing will be held by this Department 
regarding the items checked below. 
m 
u 
Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Depart-
ment's intention to suspend your driving privileges as a result of your 
arrest for driving under the influence on Z—Z 
• 
Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Depart-
ment's intention to revoke your driving privileges as a result of your 
arrest for driving under the influence and alleged refusal to submit to 
a chemical test on _ 
.you We have received information that on 
were driving while your driving privilege was under revocation/-
suspension. Failure to appear at this hearing may ^ sult it¥extenjjon 
of your revocation or suspttAsk)n. 
Your hearing has been set as follows: 
DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 
November 21, 1988 
2 : 0 0 p . m . *&s 
±< 
tt 
go 
'air 
§ 8 
•4-
O 
UL S 
fff**3fS 
r* K V 4 /•.• ?i .. , . 
. •-» n ^ -^  ; fc 
U rj * \Z ^ti'&l 
187 North 1000 W. (Fairgrounds) ^ > | A if S j - f j f g-§ 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Ut £ 2 S 3 l 3 I g-§ fc 
538-8490 
IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO APPEAR AT THE TIME INDICATED. YOU MUST NOTIFY THE 
OFFICE AT LEAST FIVE (5) DAYS BEFORE THE SCHEDULED TIME. AND UPON 
REASONABLE REQUEST. A NEW HEARING DATE MAY BE SCHEDULED. 
William R. Russel l 
Attorney a t Law 
102 W. 500 So. #202 
Salt Lake C i ty , Ut 84101 
Encl : F i l e copy to a t t n y . 
pbj /114-1 
Very truly yours, 
Phil G. Himmelberger, Bureau Chief 
Driver Services 
c? 
ADDENDUM F 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
JLU-^b-Sb 
DOB: 0 8 - 0 5 - 3 8 
N O R M A H H BANGERUR GOVERNOR JOHN T NIELSEN COMMISSIONED 
0 OOUGIAS BOORERO DEPUT* COMMISSIONER 
I DAlE ELTON DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
VERDON C BRINKERHOFF 
917 PARK ROW 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT. 84105 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
FILE NUMBER 001434579 
BY AUTHORITY OF TITLE 41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953r IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOUR PRIVILEGE TO OPERATE A MOTOR 
VEHICLE ON THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE IS SUSPENDED FOR A 
PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS EFFECTIVE 25 NOVEMBER 1988. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU 
IMMEDIATELY SURRENDER TO THIS DEPARTMENT YOUR UTAH DRIVER LICENSE, IF 
ANY, AND ALL OTHER LICENSES ISSUED TO YOU. 
THE GROUNDS FOR SUCH ACTION IS U.C.A. 41-2-130 AND THAT 
A PEACE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE YOU HAD 
BEEN OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE IN VIOLATION OF 
41-6-44 (DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE LAW). 
U.C.A.? 1 
UTAH LAW RE3UIRES ANY PERSON WHOSE UTAH DRIVING PRIVILEGE 
HAS BEEN SUSPENDED OR REVOKED TO PAY A $50.00 FEE FOLLOjFlN^ 
THE REVOCATION OR SUSPENSION PERIOD TO HAVE THIS PRIVILEGE;' 
REINSTATED. IN ADDITION TO THE REINSTATEMENT FEE, A $2§Io6 
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE FEE WILL BE ASSESSED WHEN THE *; ~ 
PRIVILEGE TO DRIVE HAS BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY SUSPENDED fOR> 
BEING ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. Q F 
ill £ 
IF YOU HAVE NOT VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED WITHIN 20 DAYS h-ALfe 
LICENSES AND PERMITS AND A PICKUP ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUElfTOS 
THESE ITEMS, AN ADDITIONAL $25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT ~ 
THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT. ~ 4f 
H r 
Cu * 
IT IS A MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPON USE 
HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE WHILE YOUR DRIVER LICENSE IS C | 
SUSPENDED OR REVOKED. £ 
YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN A COURT OF RECORD IN THE 
COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS. 
-J - *z 
I'; a. 
CO C3 
c 
o c 
6 * 
7) a 
Q 
>.: c 
:. o 
^ v., — 
— ^ r co 
~ j? C 
TZ - C 
c . c 
c •- o 
- <1) C 
ID w 
a s a 
E * £ 
,-CJ3 
5 2 £ £ 
Cl
=: William R. Russell 
Attorney at Law 
102 West 500 South #202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
RESPECTFULLY YOURS, 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, DIRECTOR 
DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
DI 203 
ADDENDUM G 
^ ^ , i ff f 
orman ri. Banserter i 
'jov«rnor 
of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF PU3LIC SAFETY 
DRIVEE LICENSE DIVISION 
G. Barton Blacxstooc Bureau Chief 
Recoraa Bureau 
4501 Sootn 7^CQWest. 2ia floor 
DA 11-2-89 
November 16, 1989 
D. Dauartaa Bodrero i 
CommiaaioMr \ ° ° Sex iQ^Q 
Srant Johnson \ Sail Lane Ctv. man *ii3(M560 
Deoucy Cotnnuaaionat i '80U965-U37 
File No: 
Arrest Date: 
D.O.B.: 
Under Title 41, Utah code Annotated 1953, an informal hearing will be held 
by this Department regarding the issues checked. 
f Tour request for an administrative hearing regarding this Department's 
' Y I intention to suspend your driving privilege as a result of your arrest 
for driving under the influence of alcohol or any drug on 11-2-89 
The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether a peace officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe you have been operating or in physical control 
of a motor vehicle while in violation of UCA 41-6-44. 
Your request for an administrative hearing regarding this Department's 
1 1 intention to revoke your driving privilege as a result of your arrest 
for driving under the influence of alcohol or any drug and the issue of 
your alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test on . 
The purpose of this hearing is to determine if you refused a chemical 
blood test after warning and request by a peace officer with reasonable 
grounds to believe you were operating or in physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug. 
t You were driving while your driving privilege was under revocation/suspension. 
I _J Failure to appear at this hearing may result in extension of you revocation/ 
suspension. 
Your hearing has been set as follows: 
DATE: 
TIME: 
PLACE: 187 North 1000 W. (Fairgrounds) 
Salt Lake City, Ut 
538-8490 
ONLY IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO APPEAR AT THE TIME INDICATED, YOU MUST NOTIFY THE 
OFFICE AT LEAST (5) DAYS BEFORE THE SCTEDOLED TIME AND, ONLY UPON REASONABLE 
GROUNDS, WILL THE HEARING BE CONTINUED. 
William R. Russell 
Attorney af Law 
8 East Broadway #213 
Salt Lake City, Ut 841U 
¥U 
End: File copy to attny. & 2 subpoenas 
»spectively> 
Phil Himmelberger 
Bureau Chief 
